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[S]ociety must insist on the maintenance of the 'going concern"
and must if necessary sacrifice to it the individual rights of




In the year before United Airlines filed for bankruptcy
reorganization, the firm lost $3.2 billion. 2 Fierce competition in the
airline industry prevents United from stemming its losses solely
through increases in revenues. Costs will have to be cut. The
necessary expense reductions could come from reductions in employee
pay and benefits, reductions in the amounts owing to creditors (which
reduce interest expense), or both. Which should it be?
United's situation is complicated by the fact that its employees
own 55 percent of its stock and that their wage levels are protected by
a collective bargaining agreement. 3  But if we assume those
protections away, we reach a fundamental issue that has divided
bankruptcy scholars for two decades: whose interests should
bankruptcy reorganization serve?
The currently prevailing contractarian theories of the firm and
of bankruptcy recommend cutting labor costs first. Bankruptcy, these
theorists postulate, exists solely for the benefit of the creditors and
shareholders of the firm. The theorists recognize that the interests of
employees, suppliers, customers, and communities should be taken
into account to the extent particular members of those constituencies
are creditors with enforceable legal rights against assets under
nonbankruptcy law. But they assert that to take any other interest of
1. PETER F. DRUCKER, CONCEPT OF THE CORPORATION 21 (rev. ed. 1972).
2. UAL CORPORATION, 10-K REPORT item 6 (2002) (showing (3,212) as the "Net earnings
(loss)" for the year ended December 31, 2002, stated in millions), http://www.sec.gov/Archives/
edgar/data1100517/000010051703000007/ual.htm.
3. Id. item 1 (listing collective bargaining agreements and expiration dates).
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those constituencies into account would-as one writer put it-
constitute "prima facie theft."
4
The theorists' first premise derives from the agency theory of
the firm. Shareholders own the firm. The board of directors, the
managers, and the employees are the shareholders' agents, mere hired
hands. When the firm is insolvent, ownership shifts to the creditors.
In bankruptcy reorganization, the owners' interests, and theirs alone,
are to be served. Debt, it follows, should be cut only as a last resort-
after any possible cuts in labor costs.
Another group of bankruptcy scholars, sometimes referred to as
"traditionalists," are of the less elegant view that bankruptcy exists to
serve a variety of policies and therefore a variety of interests. Their
answer to the hypothetical is that the losses should be shared among
all interested parties, including creditors and shareholders. Because
their arguments are noncontractarian and do not place economic
efficiency first, they fall on deaf contractarian ears. The two groups
talk past one another. 5
In 1999, Professors Margaret Blair and Lynn Stout introduced
a new and powerful contractarian theory of the public corporation-
one that only now is beginning to have its impact. 6 In this Team
Production Theory of the firm, shareholders and creditors are no
longer primary. They are merely two members of the production
team. 7
The Team Production Theory has striking implications for
bankruptcy theory. Applied to bankruptcy reorganization, the Team
Production Theory turns existing contractarian bankruptcy theory
virtually upside down. Bankruptcy reorganization ceases to be a
regulation imposed by government and instead becomes a contract
term by which creditors and shareholders agree to subordinate their
legal rights to the preservation of the going concern. That preservation
may require that the firm honor team production obligations by giving
them priority over "legal" obligations. In the case of United, for
4. Charles W. Mooney, Jr., A Normative Theory of Bankruptcy Law: Bankruptcy Law As
(Is) Civil Procedure (2004) (unpublished manuscript, on file with author) ("But however the
approach may be disguised in noble rhetoric, service to these extraneous interests at the expense
of or risk to rightsholders is prima facie theft.").
5. Douglas G. Baird, Bankruptcy's Uncontested Axioms, 108 YALE L.J. 573, 575 (1998)
(acknowledging that two groups of bankruptcy scholars exist and that "few in either group pay
much attention to the other").
6. Margaret M. Blair & Lynn A. Stout, A Team Production Theory of Corporate Law, 85
VA. L. REV. 247 (1999).
7. Id.
8. "Legal" appears in quotation marks because these contractual obligations to creditors
and shareholders are no more legally binding than the rights of other team members to
2004] 743
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example, it may require that the firm reward employees for past or
future contributions by continuing to pay above-market wages and
pass the costs on to creditors by reducing the amounts owing to them.
The Team Production Theory of Bankruptcy Reorganization,
like the Creditors' Bargain Theory it challenges, is contractarian. It
attempts to identify economically efficient institutions by assuming
they are the institutions contracting parties would choose. In contrast
to the Creditors' Bargain Theory, which is based on a hypothetical
contract derived by the theorist, the Team Production Theory is based
on the actual contracts entered into by team members. Researchers
can test the Team Production Theory empirically by determining
whether the actual contracts match those asserted by the Team
Production theorist. The theory is both positive in attempting to
describe the actual contracts among the team members and normative
in its assertion that the actual contracts should be enforced because
they are efficient.
Part II of this article describes and critiques the currently
prevailing contractarian theory of bankruptcy, the Creditors' Bargain
Theory. Part III lays out the Team Production Theory of Corporate
Law and briefly notes its points of departure from prior theory. Part
IV presents the Team Production Theory of Bankruptcy
Reorganization and explains its application. Part V explores the Team
Production Theory's implications for bankruptcy system operation by
comparing them to Creditors' Bargain Theory's implications. The
comparison shows Team Production Theory implications to be more
congruent with bankruptcy system operation than are Creditors'
Bargain Theory implications. Part VI concludes that Team Production
Theory should be taken seriously because it so accurately describes
bankruptcy system operation. Ultimately, however, the Team
Production Theory will stand or fall on the basis of empirical evidence.
II. THE CREDITORS' BARGAIN THEORY OF BANKRUPTCY
Professor Thomas H. Jackson proposed the Creditors' Bargain
Theory of bankruptcy in an article published in 1982.9 Jackson
proposed to "view bankruptcy as a system designed to mirror the
agreement one would expect the creditors to form among themselves
were they able to negotiate such an agreement from an ex ante
governance by a board of directors. All parties agreed that the board could alter the rights of
creditors and shareholders through bankruptcy. See infra Part III.A.
9. Thomas H. Jackson, Bankruptcy, Non-Bankruptcy Entitlements, and the Creditors'
Bargain, 91 YALE L.J. 857, 860 (1982).
744 [Vol. 57:3:741
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position."10 That is, Jackson assumed that the essential features of
the bankruptcy system were imposed on creditors; creditors did not
choose them. He proposed to calculate what features the creditors
would have chosen had they been free to choose. He assumed that the
terms of their hypothetical bargain would be efficient because those
terms would be the product of unfettered bargaining among property
owners. Once derived, those terms would stand as a critique of the
corresponding provisions of bankruptcy law. Thus, Jackson's theory-
like Team Production-fell within the larger class of theories referred
to as "contractarian."
Jackson developed the theory in a series of articles coauthored
with Professor Douglas Baird,1 an article coauthored with Professor
Robert Scott,12 and a book. 13 Two key moves defined the Creditors'
Bargain Theory and drove the results. The first move was to consider
only entitlements created under nonbankruptcy law as legitimate.
That is, in calculating the hypothetical bargain that would define the
ideal bankruptcy system, Creditors' Bargain theorists assumed that
the parties bargained solely from the entitlements created under
nonbankruptcy law, and did not bargain from any entitlements
created under bankruptcy laws. Jackson did not argue for this
position, but simply adopted it as a first premise: "[I]n its role as a
collective debt-collection device, bankruptcy law should not create
rights. Instead, it should act to ensure that the rights that exist are
vindicated to the extent possible."14 In a later article, Baird joined in
making the same point. "Bankruptcy law should change a substantive
nonbankruptcy entitlement rule only when doing so preserves the
value of assets for the group of investors holding rights in them."15
Bankruptcy entitlements were dismissed as attempts to redistribute
wealth.1 6 The effect was to adopt and legitimize the particular set of
10. Id.
11. E.g., Douglas G. Baird & Thomas H. Jackson, Fraudulent Conveyance Law and Its
Proper Domain, 38 VAND. L. REV. 829 (1985).
12. Thomas H. Jackson & Robert E. Scott, On the Nature of Bankruptcy: An Essay on
Bankruptcy Sharing and the Creditors'Bargain, 75 VA. L. REV. 155 (1989).
13. THOMAS H. JACKSON, THE LOGIC AND LIMITS OF BANKRUPTCY LAw (1986).
14. JACKSON, supra note 13, at 22.
15. Douglas G. Baird & Thomas H. Jackson, Corporate Reorganizations and the Treatment
of Diverse Ownership Interests: A Comment on Adequate Protection of Secured Creditors in
Bankruptcy, 51 U. CHI. L. REV. 97, 100 (1984).
16. See, e.g., Jackson & Scott, supra note 12, at 160 ("A central premise underlying this
creditors' bargain conceptualization is that a system of state law entitlements (including
priorities among secured and unsecured creditors) is already in place and that parties know what
their priority positions will be so long as state law continues to govern their rights."); id. at 161
("The participants in the bankruptcy bargain could thus be expected to honor this relationship by
maintaining the secured creditors' nonbankruptcy entitlements and by preventing redistribution
20041 745
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creditor entitlements that had existed in the nineteenth century,
before enactment of the first permanent bankruptcy legislation.
Bankruptcy entitlements developed as a response to the
harshness of the rules determining nonbankruptcy entitlements. 17
They included priorities for employees,18  taxing authorities, 19
consumers who made deposits against future purchases, 20 and others.
They also included expansions of the entitlements of subordinate
creditors and shareholders, at the expense of secured creditors.
Secured creditors lost not only their power to liquidate defaulting
debtors but also some of their rights to accrue interest during the
bankruptcy case. 21
Congress and the courts created bankruptcy entitlements with
full knowledge of nonbankruptcy entitlements and with the intention
of modernizing them. 22 Not surprisingly, once Congress acted to cure
the system's deficiencies through changes in bankruptcy law, the
evolution of nonbankruptcy law and entitlements slowed. No further
evolution was needed. 23 The problems had already been dealt with in
in bankruptcy from secured creditors to unsecured creditors and the debtor."); id. at 155-56 ("The
cornerstone of the creditors' bargain is the normative claim that prebankruptcy entitlements
should be impaired in bankruptcy only when necessary to maximize net asset distributions to the
creditors as a group and never to accomplish purely distributional goals.").
17. E.g., WILLIM D. WARREN & DANIEL J. BUSSEL, BANKRUPTCY 20 (6th ed. 2002) ("Outside
of bankruptcy, there is often little relief for a debtor who is unable to pay creditors.").
18. 11 U.S.C. § 507(a)(3)-(4) (2000).
19. 11 U.S.C. § 507(a)(8).
20. 11 U.S.C. § 507(a)(6).
21. United Sav. Ass'n of Tex. v. Timbers of Inwood Forest Assocs., 484 U.S. 365 (1988).
Jackson opposed this development by filing amicus briefs in both the Supreme Court and the
Ninth Circuit case Crocker National Bank v. American Mariner Industries, Inc. Id. at 367;
Crocker Nat'l Bank v. Am. Mariner Indus., Inc., 734 F.2d 426, 427 (9th Cir. 1984).
22. E.g., Susan Block-Lieb, Fishing in Muddy Waters: Clarifying the Common Pool Analogy
as Applied to the Standard for Commencement of a Bankruptcy Case, 42 AM. U.L. REV. 337, 391
(1993) ("[T]he sales procedures of the federal bankruptcy system are generally perceived as
Ivastly superior to those employed in the state remedies subsystem.' '); Ronald J. Mann,
Bankruptcy and the Entitlements of the Government: Whose Money Is It Anyway?, 70 N.Y.U. L.
REV. 1005 (1995) ("[Tlhe bankruptcy system replaces the rigid and unproductive procedures that
characterize state execution sales with a flexible process that allows the trustee to proceed in a
the manner most likely to produce the greatest net recovery.").
23. For example, once Congress provided debtors with the right to de-accelerate mortgage
loans through bankruptcy, state legislatures had no reason to address the problem under state
law. See, e.g., LYNN M. LOPuCKi & ELIZABETH WARREN, SECURED CREDIT: A SYSTEMS APPROACH
239 (4th ed. 2003) ("To look at acceleration and cure only under state law, however, gives a false
impression. The see the relationship between default, acceleration and cure requires
consideration of state and bankruptcy law together. Most of the creditor's rights are found in
state law; most of the debtor's rights are found in bankruptcy law. The two sets of laws combine
to create a system in which the debtor who has the ability to cure a default and make the
installment payments generally will have the opportunity to do so."); Lynn M. LoPucki, A
General Theory of the Dynamics of the State Remedies/Bankruptcy System, 1982 WIS. L. REV.
311, 314-51 (arguing that the bankruptcy system performs the same functions as the state
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bankruptcy law. Persons significantly disadvantaged under
nonbankruptcy law, policymakers apparently concluded, could solve
their problems by forcing matters into bankruptcy.
To illustrate, under nonbankruptcy law employees have no
priority over other unsecured creditors for unpaid wages and benefits
Under bankruptcy law, however, employees have priority for up to
$4,650 over other unsecured creditors for wages and benefits. 24
Unpaid employees' lack of priority under nonbankruptcy law does not
harm them because they can usually petition the debtor into
involuntary bankruptcy, and receive their bankruptcy priority.25
Once nonbankruptcy lawyers became comfortable with the
bankruptcy system in the 1980s, even business reorganizations
outside bankruptcy were effectuated with bankruptcy entitlements in
mind. Bankruptcy and nonbankruptcy entitlements functioned as part
of a single system, so reform proposals took the cumulative effect of
both into account.26 The Creditors' Bargain Theory sought to destroy
that harmony by accepting the entitlements that happened to be
lodged in nonbankruptcy law while rejecting those lodged in
bankruptcy law. Creditors' Bargain theorists took as their first
principle that entitlements in bankruptcy should not differ from
entitlements in the absence of bankruptcy. 27
The Creditors' Bargain theorists were eventually forced to
modify that first principle by acknowledging that the bankruptcy rule
might sometimes be better. 28 By the time that concession occurred,
however, the Creditors' Bargain Theory was so well established that
no one noticed that the concession left the Creditors' Bargain Theory
with no foundation. The theory originated as a critique of bankruptcy
law based on nonbankruptcy entitlements. If bankruptcy law was of
remedies system, but performs them better); id. at 351 (concluding that "in dealing with the
debtor in financial difficulty the bankruptcy subsystem performs the functions of the state
remedies/bankruptcy system better than the state remedies subsystem in nearly every respect.").
24. 11 U.S.C. § 507(a)(3), (4) (2002).
25. See LYNN M. LoPucKI & CHRISTOPHER R. MIRICK, STRATEGIES FOR CREDITORS IN
BANKRuPTcY PROCEEDINGS § 2.08 (4th ed. 2003) (discussing this strategy for "preserving wage
and benefit priorities").
26. LoPucki, supra note 23, at 311 (proposing reform based on combined analysis of the two
systems).
27. See supra note 12 and accompanying text.
28. Douglas G. Baird, Loss Distribution, Forum Shopping, and Bankruptcy: A Reply to
Warren, 54 U. CHI. L. REV. 815, 822 (1987) ("Whenever we must have a legal rule to distribute
losses in bankruptcy, we must also have a legal rule that distributes the same loss outside of
bankruptcy. All Jackson and I advocate is that these two rules be the same."); id. at 823 ("The
only point Jackson and I make is that the priorities that exist under nonbankruptcy law should
run parallel to priorities in bankruptcy. To the extent that these priorities generate bad
distributional consequences, they should be changed in both settings.").
2004]
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equal dignity with nonbankruptcy law, the theory became a two-edged
sword. It could as easily be used to impeach nonbankruptcy
entitlements on the basis that they differed from bankruptcy
entitlements as for its original purpose of impeaching bankruptcy
entitlements on the basis that they differed from nonbankruptcy
entitlements. Because it provided no basis to determine which
direction the inference should go, the theory was useless.
Creditors' Bargain theorists' second defining move was to
regard the corporation as merely a "pool of assets" rather than as a
relationship among people and assets. Because the corporation was
merely a pool of assets, Jackson reasoned, only those with legal rights
in assets were entitled to the benefits of bankruptcy reorganization:
Under much modern corporate law it is most useful to view shareholders, unsecured
creditors, and secured creditors as the owners of the firm. They have different packages
of rights to the assets at different times, but they all have the right to call on the firm's
assets under one set of circumstances or another .... Once one identifies those with
rights against the assets, one has identified the pool of owners.
2 9
Jackson concluded that others "have no rights that need to be
accounted for in a collective proceeding. '30 This narrow view of the
interests bankruptcy should protect excludes the interests of
managers, workers, suppliers, customers, taxing authorities, and
other members of the production team.3
1
Given that the large majority of reorganizing firms are
insolvent, the Creditors' Bargain was essentially a bargain that in the
event of bankruptcy, the creditors would get everything. The firm
29. JACKSON, supra note 13, at 32-33.
30. Id. at 33.
31. Both Baird and Jackson wrestled with the issue of whether workers should be included
in the Creditors' Bargain theory. Each concluded they should not. Jackson stated:
Workers may have an entitlement to a certain wage level, but as nonbankruptcy law
is currently set up, they have no draw as workers on the assets. They have no say as
to whether the assets should remain doing what they are doing or not. They may have
claims on the assets to secure their wages or the future terms of their collective
bargaining agreement, but to the extent that they do, they are creditors, and it is
better to think of them as creditors than as workers. Managers, moreover, may have a
good deal of day-to-day control and the leverage that comes from controlling the
operating machinery, but they have no legal rights to use the assets (other than the
assets represented by their own services) in opposition to the wishes of the
shareholders and creditors. Thus, they have no rights that need to be accounted for in
a collective proceeding ....
Id. at 32-33. Baird recognized that employees and managers could "in some sense" be considered
owners. Douglas G. Baird, The Uneasy Case for Corporate Reorganizations, 15 J. LEGAL STUD.
127, 130 (1986) ('This [Creditors' Bargain] view of ownership could be expanded even further.
For example, a contributor of labor to a firm may in some sense be seen as an "owner."). But he
continued to regard them as nonowners, who would be included in actual bargaining but not in
the hypothetical bargain by which he evaluated bankruptcy law. E.g., id. at 140 ("In both
liquidations and reorganizations, the owners must bargain with the existing managers .... ).
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should continue to operate only if continued operation was in the
interests of the creditors. If the firm did continue to operate, the firm
should do so in the manner that maximized benefit to the creditors,
even if the effect was to inflict losses on noncreditors. Any
consideration of noncreditor interests, the Creditors' Bargain Theory
held, would be inefficient.
The Team Production Theory of Bankruptcy Reorganization
reaches the conclusion opposite Jackson's. All who made firm-specific
investments have rights that need to be accounted for in a collective
proceeding. But to understand that theory, one must first understand
the Team Production Theory of Corporate Law upon which it is based.
III. THE TEAM PRODUCTION THEORY OF CORPORATE LAW
A. The Theory
Team Production Theory derives its name from the team
production concept in the institutional economics literature. 32 The
theory is an empirically testable hypothesis regarding the actual
bargain among the constituent groups that compose the public
corporation.
The hypothesis is that the constituent groups-the "team"-
deliberately delegate to the corporation's board of directors ultimate
authority over both the direction of the enterprise and the distribution
among team members of production rents and surpluses. The team
members include all who make firm-specific investments but are
unable to protect those investments by direct contracting, personal
trust, or reputation. 33 Team members may include stockholders,
creditors, executives, other employees, suppliers, customers, local
governments, regulatory agencies, and others.3 4  Team members
intend that they all share in the production rents and surpluses, but
are unable to contract directly for that result. Blair and Stout explain
the dilemma this way:
32. E.g., Armen A. Alchian & Harold Demsetz, Production, Information Costs, and
Economic Organization, 62 AM. ECON. REV. 777, 779-81 (1972) (discussing "team production").
33. Margaret M. Blair & Lynn A. Stout, Director Accountability and the Mediating Role of
the Corporate Board, 79 WASH. U. L.Q. 403, 416 (2001) (referring to "any group that makes itself
vulnerable by making investments specific to the corporation that are not completely protected
by an enforceable contract").
34. Blair & Stout, supra note 6, at 253 (listing team members); Lynn A. Stout, Bad and
Not-So-Bad Arguments for Shareholder Primacy, 75 S. CAL. L. REV. 1189, 1195-96 (2002)
(discussing various team members).
2004]
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Particularly when production is ongoing, when inputs are difficult to monitor, when the
future is uncertain-in other words, in the everyday business environment-explicit
contracts that accurately dole out the benefits of production according to contribution
and merit are difficult or impossible to draft. Suppose team members agree ex ante to a
sharing rule (for example, "divide all gains from team production equally"). Such a rule
creates incentives for individual team members to shirk because each member will enjoy
the full benefit of her shirking while sharing the cost with the rest of the team. On the
other hand, if the team decides to wait and divide up the gains ex post, they may
succumb to wasteful "rent-seeking," squabbling over which member is entitled to claim a
bigger share. Uncontrolled shirking and rent-seeking can reduce and even destroy the
economic gains that flow from team production.
3 5
Team members solve this problem by delegating authority over
the division of production rents and surpluses to an independent
group-the board of directors. 36 The team members intend and expect
the board to divide the rents and surplus among team members based
on each member's contributions to the team. Shares are to be awarded
both to create incentives for future contributions to the team effort
and to reward past contributions.
37
Team members do not rely entirely on the board for their
compensation. Instead, each member negotiates a contract with the
corporation that assures the member of some minimum share. For
executives of the corporation, that may be a salary, stock options,
severance pay, and other perks. Creditors' contract rights will include
payment of interest and repayment of principal, as well as the right to
withdraw their investment in specified circumstances. Customers may
receive legally binding warranty promises.
Each of the team members, however, expects something more.
38
That something may vary with production requirements, firm success,
the team member's actual contribution, and other factors. For
executives, it may be extra bonuses, corporate jets, or club
memberships. For bank lenders, it may be either the continuation of
the lending relationship even when the bank cannot offer the best
terms, or the corporation's pursuit of less risky projects than are
permitted under the loan documents. For employees, it may be
35. Margaret M. Blair & Lynn A. Stout, Team Production in Business Organizations: An
Introduction, 24 J. CORP. L. 743, 745 (1999). Shleifer & Summers make almost the same point.
Andrei Shleifer & Lawrence H. Summers, Breach of Trust in Hostile Takeovers, in CORPORATE
TAKEOVERS: CAUSES AND CONSEQUENCES 33, 37 (Alan J. Auerbach ed., 1988) ("[Ilt is important
to the shareholders that the stakeholders do a good job, but shareholders may be unable to
describe what specific actions this calls for, let alone to contract for them.").
36. Blair & Stout, supra note 6, at 271-77 (describing how the delegation overcomes the
contracting problem).
37. E.g., Blair & Stout, supra note 33, at 415 ("Employees and managers usually make
these investments because they believe that in the long run, the firm will reward them with
raises, promotions, and job security.").
38. See supra note 35 and accompanying text.
750 [Vol. 57:3:741
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Christmas bonuses, company picnics, above-market wages and
benefits, or continued employment when the employee is so old or sick
that the corporation could do better in the marketplace. For
customers, it may be product support beyond that promised in the
contract, or continuation of that support beyond the time when it is
cost-effective for the corporation to provide it.
39
Team members generally understand that they have no legal
right to this something more.40 If the corporation does not provide it,
they cannot sue. Team members also understand that the size and
shape of the something more will change with the changing fortunes
and circumstances of the firm. But the team members nevertheless
regard it as an entitlement. It is not a gift; it is a quid pro quo. Failure
to provide this quid pro quo would be a betrayal. It is one for which
the team member will have no legal remedy, but it is a betrayal just
the same.
Team members choose to trust the board in part because they
cannot trust each other. Board members receive salaries and perks,
and may own some small amount of stock. But corporate law restricts
their right to enrich themselves at the expense of the corporation. 41
Board members cannot usurp corporate opportunities or control
decisions in which their own interests conflict with those of the
corporation. They are not residual claimants under the team
production contract.42 To put it most bluntly, directors can steal, but
directors cannot steal much. Those are the conditions most conducive
to the fulfillment of a trust obligation. 43
Although team members can renegotiate their individual
contracts with the firm, they cannot renegotiate the Team Production
deal. Once team members have made their firm-specific contributions,
they lack the leverage necessary to renegotiate.
The alternative to trusting the board would be to trust one of
the team members. None, however, is likely to be as trustworthy as
39. The firm is likely to justify its provision of such support as in the long range interests of
the firm because it creates customer goodwill. That may not, however, be the true calculus. Even
if the board were shown that the firm would never recoup the expenditures from customers, the
board might make them anyway from a sense of obligation. To put it more formally, the
expenditure is not ex post efficient, but it is ex ante efficient.
40. Blair & Stout, supra note 6, at 285 (describing the team's reasons for eschewing legal
recourse); Shleifer & Summers, supra note 35, at 37 ("[T]he corporation must be trusted to
deliver on the implicit contracts even without enforcement by courts.").
41. Blair & Stout, supra note 6, at 315 ("[C]orporate law encourages directors to serve their
firms' interests by severely limiting their abilities to serve their own." (Emphasis in original)).
42. This principle is violated when employees of the firm serve as "inside" directors or when
directors have substantial shareholdings.
43. Blair & Stout, supra note 33, at 441-44 (explaining the importance of removing
director's opportunities for self-gain).
2004]
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the board. Each team member who might possibly serve as trustee has
a massive conflict of interest that would corrupt not only the division
of rents and surplus, but corporate decision making as well.
44
Shareholder representatives would adopt inefficiently risky business
policies; creditor representatives would adopt inefficiently
conservative ones. Employee representatives might maintain wages
and employment at the expense of other team members. Every
decision would be suspect.
For this trust-the-directors approach to work, directors must
have independence from the team members. They must not govern at
the sufferance of shareholders, managers, or creditors. Those
constituencies cannot have control over the board except in the most
extreme circumstances. Thus, team production is what Professor
Steve Bainbridge refers to as a "director primacy" theory.45 As Blair
and Stout put it, directors "are not subject to direct control or
supervision by anyone, including the firm's shareholders.
'46
B. Competing Theories
Director primacy theories such as the Team Production Theory
conflict with the shareholder primacy theories currently in vogue
among law and economics scholars. Shareholder primacy theories
regard the shareholders as the owners of the corporation and directors
and officers as their agents, "mere stewards of the shareholders'
interests.."47  Shareholder primacists argue that because the
shareholders elect the directors, the directors serve at the
shareholders' pleasure.
Blair and Stout respond that the election mechanism does not
function in the modern public corporation. 48  Team members,
including the shareholders themselves, have deliberately disabled it. 49
44. Blair & Stout, supra note 6, at 271-74 (explaining the delegation).
45. Stephen M. Bainbridge, Director Primacy: The Means and Ends of Corporate
Governance, 97 Nw. U. L. REV. 547, 549-50 (2003).
46. Blair & Stout, supra note 6, at 290.
47. Bainbridge, supra note 45, at 547.
48. Blair & Stout, supra note 33, at 434 ("[A]s a practical matter, the casting of shareholder
votes in most public corporations is a meaningless rite.").
49. For example, founders set firms up in such a manner that the firm will pay the board's
expenses in a proxy fight, but not the challengers'. The effect is to make proxy fights impractical.
E.g., Lucian Arye Bebchuk & Marcel Kahan, A Framework for Analyzing Legal Policy Towards
Proxy Contests, 78 CAL. L. REV. 1073, 1106 (1990) ("Only a few reported cases have dealt with
reimbursement of proxy contest expenses. Courts largely have left the decision of whether to
reimburse contestants to the discretion of the board of directors. Consequently companies
generally pay all the expenses for the reelection campaign of incumbents, but reimburse
challengers only if they gain control over the board of directors.").
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Directors of public companies nominate, and effectively elect,
themselves and their successors. Shareholders are nearly powerless to
contest elections, and that is how the shareholders want it.50 In
theory, a single person or entity could take over the company by
acquiring a block of stock sufficiently large to elect directors. But in
practice, Blair and Stout maintain, hostile takeovers occur only in the
most extreme circumstances because directors-with the consent of
shareholders-have deployed anti-takeover devices. 51  The
shareholders tolerate broken election machinery and anti-takeover
devices, Blair and Stout maintain, to provide other members the
assurance they need to join the team. Managers, employees, creditors,
and others would shun a public corporation in which shareholders
retained the ability to extract every dollar of rents and surplus for
themselves.
52
Formally, boards of directors hire and fire CEOs and other top
executives. Managerialist theories maintain that the relationship
works just the opposite: CEOs and top executives capture and control
their boards. 53 The Team Production Theory is based on the
empirically testable assumption that directors generally dominate the
relationship. As Blair and Stout put it, "It is the board, and not the
professional managers, that retains the power to control major
decisions in most large firms .. ."54 There is considerable reason to
believe that this assumption is correct. 55
50. Blair & Stout, supra note 33, at 445-46 ("[T]eam production analysis suggests that
shareholders as a class are better off if they "tie their own hands" by ceding control of the firm to
a mediating board .... ").
51. Blair & Stout, supra note 33, at 434 ("[H]ostile takeovers-whether attempted through
tender offers or proxy battles-are difficult, risky, and expensive. Shareholders' theoretical
ability to 'vote with their feet' in the market for corporate control thus seems likely to impose
only a modest constraint on [directors]...."); Lynn A. Stout, Do Antitakeover Defenses Decrease
Shareholder Wealth? The Ex Post/Ex Ante Valuation Problem, 55 STAN. L. REV. 845, 854-55
(2003).
52. In most privately held firms, shareholders do maintain that control. Presumably,
privately held firms must have other means for inducing members to join in team production.
Blair and Stout limit their Team Production Theory to public corporations, but discuss the
private firm problem separately. Margaret M. Blair & Lynn A. Stout, Trust, Trustworthiness,
and the Behavioral Foundations of Corporate Law, 149 U. PA. L. REV. 1735, 1799-1807 (2001).
53. Bainbridge, supra note 45, at 548 ("Managerialism perceives the corporation as a
bureaucratic hierarchy dominated by professional managers. Directors are figureheads, while
shareholders are nonentities. Thus, under managerialist models, managers are autonomous
actors.").
54. Blair & Stout, supra note 33, at 425.
55. See, e.g., Bainbridge, supra note 45, at 562 ('The board capture phenomenon seems less
valid today, however, than it once was. During the 1980s and 1990s, several trends began to
encourage more active and effective board oversight.").
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Blair and Stout regard Team Production as both a positive and
a normative theory.56 As positive theory, Team Production purports to
describe the actual understanding among members of the corporate
team. The theory could be refuted by showing the existence of
substantial numbers of contracts that are not in accord with its
predictions. The theory predicts that contracts granting a single team
member-such as shareholders-effective control over a public
company's board will be rare.
As normative theory, Team Production purports to be the most
efficient and therefore the most desirable basis on which to organize
firms that will solicit capital from public equity markets. The claim is
not absolute efficiency. Blair and Stout expressly acknowledge that
surrender of power to the board is a second best solution. 57 But they
assert that team production contracting dominates public corporations
because it is the best solution to the team production problem
available under the constraints of current technology, laws, and
institutions.
IV. THE TEAM PRODUCTION THEORY OF BANKRUPTCY REORGANIZATION
The Team Production Theory of Bankruptcy Reorganization
that I propose here incorporates the assumptions underlying Blair and
Stout's Team Production Theory of Corporate Law. The bankruptcy
reorganization theory adds to the corporate law theory the assertion
that the team production contract continues in force during
bankruptcy reorganization. The rationale for this addition is that the
team members intended that result at the time they contracted.
Preservation of the firm's going concern value usually requires that
much of the team remain in place and continue to produce during a
reorganization effort, but adjustments to the team production
arrangement may be necessary. For example, the team may need to
fire and replace its managers-or pay them bonuses to stay. Team
members are not, however, in a position to negotiate the necessary
adjustments. Many are already irrevocably committed to the firm.
Instead, team members long before delegated the adjustment process
to the discretion of the board.
56. E.g., Blair & Stout, supra note 33, at 444 ("[D]irectors of public firms not only enjoy, but
should enjoy, a remarkable degree of freedom from the commands of shareholders .... ).
57. Blair & Stout, supra note 6, at 250 ("We argue that public corporation law can offer a
second-best solution to team production problems .... ").
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A. Incorporation of Bankruptcy Reorganization in the Team
Production Contract
The team production contract entered into at the founding of
the public company permits resort to bankruptcy reorganization. By
doing so, it deliberately incorporates the provisions of existing
bankruptcy law. This may surprise readers who consider bankruptcy a
non-optional imposition on creditors. 58 Contracts that seek to opt out
of bankruptcy are disfavored in law. Attempts to opt out directly are
generally thought to violate public policy.5 9 This is for good reason.60
At the time of contracting, even relatively sophisticated corporate
borrowers and their lenders can underestimate the need for, and
benefits of, bankruptcy.61 The most important of these needs and
benefits is to keep the team together and thus preserve the going
concern value of the business-even when the corporation cannot meet
its obligations to creditors.
The contracts that are effective in insulating a lender from
bankruptcy are necessarily somewhat convoluted. Among them are
contracts that lock control of the board of directors on default such
that the board cannot authorize a bankruptcy filing, contracts that
give voting control of the corporation to creditors on default, contracts
that give creditors leverage against control persons, contracts that
isolate collateral in separate entities within corporate groups,
58. See, e.g., Lucian Arye Bebchuk & Andrew T. Guzman, An Economic Analysis of
Transnational Bankruptcies, 42 J.L. & ECON. 775, 801 (1999) ("Because it is not possible to
contract out of the bankruptcy laws, however, this solution is not available to firms."); James
Steven Rogers, The Impairment of Secured Creditors' Rights in Reorganization: A Study of the
Relationship Between the Fifth Amendment and the Bankruptcy Clause, 96 HARV. L. REV. 973,
995 (1983) ("One simply cannot contract out of the bankruptcy power."); Alan Schwartz, A
Contract Theory Approach to Business Bankruptcy, 107 YALE L.J. 1807, 1833 (1998) ("Because
bankruptcy contracts are currently illegal, there is no data about real contracts that could
support this argument. The goal here is to render plausible the view that bankruptcy contracting
would occur if it were permitted.").
59. E.g., In re Tru Block Concrete Prods., 27 B.R. 486 (Bankr. S.D. Cal. 1983) (declining to
dismiss a bankruptcy case to enforce a contract that barred the debtor from filing bankruptcy).
60. The contract that eliminates bankruptcy can be a contract with a single creditor. That
would create no problem in a world of perfect information and zero transaction costs. Creditors
disadvantaged by the elimination would contract to prevent elimination contracts. Even though
a no-elimination regime is the probable equilibrium, the web of no-elimination contracts does not
yet exist. Until it does, the opportunity exists for a debtor and a single creditor to contract for a
suboptimal elimination.
61. Bankruptcy is an arcane institution. For most kinds of loans, the risk that contract
provisions with respect to bankruptcy will meaningfully affect recoveries is not sufficiently high
to warrant attention. Ronald J. Mann, Strategy and Force in the Liquidation of Secured Debt, 96
MICH. L. REV. 159, 237-42 (1997) (reporting interview responses showing creditor indifference to
bankruptcy rules). As a result, market forces may be ineffective in determining the bankruptcy
provisions of lending contracts.
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contracts placing key assets in bankruptcy-ineligible entities,
prepetition agreements to lift the automatic stay in the event of
bankruptcy, and asset- securitization contracts.62
Asset securitization illustrates the general nature of these
contracts. In the typical asset-securitization transaction, the debtor
sells assets and then contracts to continue using them. Through a
complex arrangement, multiple parties replicate for borrower and
lender the effect of a secured loan in the form of an absolute transfer
of ownership.6 3 Virtually any--or all-of a debtor's assets can be sold,
securitized, and leased back.64 If the borrower later files bankruptcy,
the securitized assets are unavailable to the bankruptcy court because
their owner is not bound by contract to permit the debtor to continue
using them. If the effect is to prevent reorganization, no
reorganization occurs.
True asset-securitization transactions-unlike secured credit
transactions-are intended to insulate the lender from the borrower's
later bankruptcy. For the investors, "bankruptcy remoteness" is the
essence of the deal.65 It follows that a lender who structures its
transaction as an asset securitization has not agreed to be subject to
bankruptcy. The Team Production Theory of Bankruptcy
Reorganization would honor that choice. But it just as certainly
follows that a lender who structures its transaction as a secured loan
has agreed to be subject to bankruptcy. For parties as sophisticated as
those involved in public corporation lending transactions, acceptance
of the default rule-bankruptcy reorganization-is a deliberate
62. LYNN M. LoPucKi, STRATEGIES FOR CREDITORS IN BANKRUPTCY PROCEEDINGS § 3.08
(4th ed. 2003) (describing each of these devices).
63. Advocates of asset securitization generally deny that the transaction is a loan disguised
as a sale, but they readily acknowledge the similarity. E.g., Steven L. Schwarcz, Commercial
Trusts as Business Organizations: Unraveling the Mystery, 58 BUS. LAW. 559, 563 (2003) ("The
investors, as senior claimants of the trust, get their money back with interest. The company, as
residual claimant, receives payment for the financial assets sold to the trust and is entitled to
any residual value of those assets once the investors are paid in full. In economic terms, the deal
is similar to a secured loan-the quintessential commercial transaction-in which surplus
collateral is returned to the debtor once lenders receive principal and interest.").
64. See, e.g., Claire A. Hill, Whole Business Securitization in Emerging Markets, 12 DUKE J.
COMP. & INT'L L. 521, 525 (2002) (reporting foreign transactions in which the special purpose
vehicle "receives as security for repayment of the loan fixed and floating charges over all or
substantially all of the borrower's assets and thus becomes a secured creditor of the borrower").
Professor Hill refers to the transaction as "nominally a securitization" but "actually a hybrid
between a true securitization and a corporate credit." Id.
65. Steven L. Schwarcz, The Alchemy ofAsset Securitization, 1 STAN. J.L. BUS. & FIN. 133,
135 (1994) ("The SPV, however, must be structured as "bankruptcy remote" to gain acceptance as
an issuer of capital market securities. Bankruptcy remote in this context means that the SPV is
unlikely to be adversely affected by a bankruptcy of the originator.").
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rejection of the alternatives by which the parties could have avoided
bankruptcy reorganization.
Public corporations engage in asset securitization transactions.
Legally, they could securitize even the productive assets of the
corporation's core business. 66 However, they rarely, if ever, do so.
Ordinarily, the assets securitized are accounts receivable-assets
which may not be crucial to continued operation of the business. The
asset-securitized creditor opts out of bankruptcy. All that prevents
other secured lenders from opting out by the same device, Team
Production Theory suggests, is the unwillingness of the board to put
one team member in a position to capture the rents and surpluses of
the entire team.
Thus, even though contracts exist that would exclude the
possibility of bankruptcy reorganization, the large majority of
contracting parties deliberately choose not to employ them. They
prefer a contract that permits resort to bankruptcy reorganization to
one that does not. Bankruptcy reorganization, in its currently existing
form, is part of the team production contract.
B. Reconciling Team Entitlements With Bankruptcy Entitlements
Mirroring the team production contract, bankruptcy law allows
the team production arrangement to continue virtually unchanged
during the reorganization process. The board remains in control of the
firm. The business judgment rule continues to apply, giving the
directors wide latitude in all matters connected with the operation of
the business.6 7 The peripheral possibility that shareholders might
oust the directors remains peripheral. The possibility does, however,
change form. For shareholders-whose rights typically are sharply
curtailed or extinguished on confirmation of a reorganization plan-
bankruptcy reorganization is an end game. As a result, shareholders'
incentives to defect from the team production contract by attempting
66. See Hill, supra note 64, at 525-26 (discussing "whole-business securitizations"); Lynn M.
LoPucki, The Death of Liability, 106 YALE L.J. 1, 25 (1996) (presenting the opinions of
commentators on the practical limits in the use of asset securitization).
67. NLRB v. Bildisco & Bildisco, 465 U.S. 513, 523 (1984) (recognizing that the business
judgment rule is used in reviewing motions to reject executory contracts); Raymond T. Nimmer &
Richard B. Feinberg, Chapter 11 Business Governance: Fiduciary Duties, Business Judgment,
Trustees and Exclusivity, 6 BANKR. DEV. J. 1, 14 (1989):
Where no expressly contrary statutory standard exists, the pure business judgment
rule dominates bankruptcy jurisprudence about decisions that affect business strategy
or tactical legal choices. As a simple proposition, the pure business judgment test is
seldom disturbed unless either the choice made imposes a large adverse impact on one
group, or the nature of the business decision threatens to dominate comprehensively
the outcome of the case.
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to elect a board loyal to them alone are greatly enhanced. But if
shareholders attempt to elect a board, the bankruptcy courts are likely
to enjoin them.68 This bankruptcy doctrine is buttressed by the
Delaware Chancery Court's recognition that, in "the vicinity of
insolvency," a board of directors has "an obligation to the community of
interests that sustained the corporation, to exercise judgment in an
informed, good faith effort to maximize the corporation's long term
wealth creating capacity"-not to serve solely the interests of
shareholders. 69 As a result, the directors are no more vulnerable to
shareholder control during bankruptcy than they were before
bankruptcy.
In one important respect, however, the firm's financial distress
and bankruptcy do reduce the board's control. In the absence of
default and exercise of creditors' rights, the board alone decides when
to terminate the team arrangement. The board does so by closing the
business or selling it as a going concern to a buyer who does not agree
to honor the team entitlements. In bankruptcy, the court also has the
power to close the business or order it sold. 70 In practice, the
bankruptcy courts rarely do either over the board's objection, so the
board remains in full control until it reorganizes, sells, or closes the
firm.
By leaving the board in full control, while at the same time
limiting creditors and shareholders to their bankruptcy entitlements,
the Team Production contract has, in effect, granted the non-legally
enforceable entitlements of team member priority over the legally
enforceable claims of creditors and interests of shareholders. To
understand why this is so requires careful examination of the
bankruptcy distribution rights of creditors and shareholders. Those
rights exist under two separate provisions of the Bankruptcy Code,
the "best interests" test 71 and the "cramdown" test.72
68. Reported and unreported cases are discussed in Lynn M. LoPucki & William C.
Whitford, Corporate Governance in the Bankruptcy Reorganization of Large, Publicly Held
Companies, 141 U. PA. L. REV. 669, 694-99 (1993). See also Manville Corp. v. Equity Sec. Holders
Comm., 801 F.2d 60, 64 (2d Cir. 1986) (stating that "the right to compel a shareholders meeting
for the purpose of electing a new board subsists during reorganization proceedings" but
acknowledging that such a meeting should be enjoined for "clear abuse" by shareholders).
69. Credit Lyonnais Bank Nederland, N.V. v. Pathe Communications Co., No. CIV.A.
12130, 1991 Del. Ch. LEXIS 215, at *108-09 (Del. Ch. Dec. 30, 1991) (emphasis added).
70. The route to such a sale is long and treacherous. A creditor must win termination of the
debtor's right of exclusivity, then propose a plan that provides for sale, and finally, win
confirmation of the plan. The point is, however, that all this can be accomplished without the
cooperation of the board.
71. 11 U.S.C. § 1129(a)(7) (2000).
72. 11 U.S.C. § 1129(b)(2).
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The amounts of bankruptcy distributions are fixed by proposal
and confirmation of a plan of reorganization. The "best interests of
creditors" and "cramdown" tests apply in different circumstances, but
each sets minimum amounts for the distributions that must be
promised to creditors and shareholders under the plan. The cramdown
test applies when a class of creditors or shareholders rejects the
plan.73 The court can confirm the plan over the rejection only if the
distribution to the class under the plan is in accord with the "absolute
priority rule." That rule, in essence, requires that the plan follow
absolutely the priorities established by law or contract. 74 The "best
interests of creditors" test has broader application, but fixes lower
entitlements. This test applies in favor of each individual creditor and
shareholder and requires that the plan promise each at least what
that creditor or shareholder would receive in a liquidation of the firm
under Chapter 7 of the Bankruptcy Code. 75
1. Cramdown
On first consideration, the cramdown provisions may seem to
assure creditors and shareholders that they will receive the entire
bankruptcy distribution, leaving no flexibility for distributions based
on team production entitlements. But on careful examination, the
flexibility becomes apparent. The cramdown test for distributions to
shareholders states: "[T]he condition that a plan be fair and equitable
with respect to a class includes the following requirements: ... With
respect to a class of interests ... the plan provides that each holder of
an interest of such class receive or retain . . . the value of such
interest ... "76 This provision only entitles shareholders to the
"value" of their shares. 77 In or out of reorganization, the value of
shares is the present value of all future earnings remaining after
allowance for the entitlements of creditors. Earnings are what is left of
revenues after expenses have been paid. Team production
entitlements are paid as expenses, whether or not the firm is in
bankruptcy. Thus, the value guaranteed shareholders by the
cramdown test is only the value remaining after team production
entitlements have been paid. In other words, team production
entitlements, like other expenses, have a claim on the earnings stream
that is prior to that of shareholders. That treatment is appropriate
73. DAVID G. EPSTEIN ETAL., BANKRUPTcY § 10-17 (1993).
74. Id. § 10-21.
75. Id. § 10-18.




because honoring team production entitlements is efficient. We know
that honoring team production entitlements is efficient because those
entitlements are payable under the team production contract and the
team production contract is the bargain actually struck by team
members.
The cramdown test for distributions to unsecured creditors
provides:
[The condition that a plan be fair and equitable with respect to a class includes the
following requirements: ... With respect to a class of unsecured claims . . . The plan
provides that each holder ... receive property of a value.., equal to the allowed amount
of such claim; or the holder of any claim or interest that is junior to the claims of such
class will not receive or retain ... any property.
7 8
This provision requires only that the plan give unsecured creditors
absolute priority over shareholders. When shareholders receive
nothing, any distribution to unsecured creditors satisfies the test.
Secured creditors have the strongest rights in cramdown. The
relevant provision states that
the condition that a plan be fair and equitable with respect to a class includes the
following requirements: ... With respect to a class of secured claims ... that each
holder... receive.., deferred cash payments ... of a value.., of at least the value of
the holder's interest in the estate's interest in [the collateral].
7 9
This provision entitles secured creditors to the value of their
collateral. But when valuation takes place in the context of
reorganization, even the value of collateral will be fixed with reference
to earnings 80-earnings calculated after the payment of team
entitlements.
To illustrate, assume a debtor that owes a claim of 100 to a
secured creditor. Assume further that the collateral is a hospital
worth 65 in liquidation, 70 in continued operation that includes
unprofitable community service, and 75 in continued operation that
does not.8' The directors wish to continue operations, including the
community service, based on an implicit understanding between the
local government and the debtor for reciprocal support. Specifically,
the local government "invested" in the hospital corporation in the past
by building streets, relaxing regulations, granting tax breaks, and
extending services. The understanding was that the corporation would
78. 11 U.S.C. § 1129(b)(2)(B).
79. Id. § 1129(b)(2)(A).
80. 11 U.S.C. § 506(a) ("Such value shall be determined in light of the purpose of the
valuation and of the proposed disposition or use of such property, and in conjunction with any
hearing on such disposition or use or on a plan affecting such creditors' interest.").
81. The costs of liquidation are assumed to be 10, which accounts for the difference between
the value in liquidation and the value in unencumbered operation.
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continue to serve the community. No legal obligation to do so was
created, but to cement the relationship, prominent members of the
community became members of the hospital corporation's board.
How should the hospital be valued for cramdown purposes?
The Bankruptcy Code provides that the holder of a secured claim is
entitled to the "value of [the] holder's interest in the estate's interest
in [the] property."8 2 In short, the secured creditor is entitled to a
distribution equal to the entire value of the hospital. That value was
assumed to be 75 in certain circumstances, but those circumstances
will not occur. The Bankruptcy Code requires that the value of
collateral be determined "in light of the purpose of the valuation and
of the proposed disposition or use of [the collateral]. '"83 Here, the
proposed disposition or use is the operation of a community hospital.
Accordingly, the value of the hospital for cramdown purposes is 70.
The directors have both the right and the duty to meet the
corporation's obligation to the community. Their right derives from
their authority to operate the business.8 4 Team Production Theory
tells us that leaving directors free to meet legally nonbinding
obligations to team members maximizes the value of the firm ex ante,
by giving effect to the Team Production bargain. Permitting a single
team member-here the secured creditor-to expropriate the team's
rents and surpluses for itself denies effect to that bargain. Admittedly,
if the hospital is the only asset of the bankruptcy estate, this course
will not maximize the value of the estate. But if the Team Production
Theory is correct, one cannot maximize both the ex ante value of the
firm and the ex post value of the bankruptcy estate.
To put it another way, the directors acting as debtor-in-
possession have the authority to commit the corporation to continued
service to the community. Their decision to do so is protected by the
business judgment rule.8 5 Once they have done so, the building is
worth 70, and that is the value to which the secured creditor is
entitled. This does not violate the secured creditors' contract, because
the secured creditor voluntarily elected the operation of the
bankruptcy process in the event the board invoked it.
82. 11 U.S.C. § 1129(b)(2)(A)(i)(II) (describing the standard for cramdown of a
reorganization plan against an objecting secured creditor).
83. 11 U.S.C. § 506(a).
84. 11 U.S.C. § 1108 authorizes "the trustee" to operate the debtor's business during
reorganization. The board is the trustee for this purpose. See Karen Gross, Taking Community
Interests into Account in Bankruptcy: An Essay, 72 WASH. U. L.Q. 1031 (1994).
85. See supra note 67 and accompanying text.
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2. Best Interests
Distributions under a plan of reorganization must meet not
only the cramdown test, but the "best interests" test as well. That test
entitles creditors and shareholders to value under the plan not less
than they would receive in a hypothetical liquidation of the debtor
under Chapter 7 of the Bankruptcy Code.86 Because the test is a
hypothetical liquidation, no allowance can be made under the test for
the payment of team production entitlements. On its face, the best
interests test clearly and unambiguously gives a priority to creditors
and shareholders.
Some bankruptcy scholars consider the liquidation value of a
firm to be equal to the firm' reorganization value. That is, they believe
that bankruptcy courts can "liquidate" businesses by selling them as
going concerns in Chapter 11 for their full going concern value.8 7 One
who holds that belief might conclude that no value at all remains
available for application to team entitlements.
That issue need not be resolved, however, because the best
interests of creditors test does not entitle creditors and shareholders
to the full price paid in an hypothetical liquidation by the board under
Chapter 11. It entitles them only to the net proceeds, after payment of
selling costs, in a hypothetical liquidation by a trustee under Chapter
7.88 A hypothetical Chapter 7 trustee theoretically could continue to
operate the firm and sell it as a going concern.8 9 But in practice, going
concerns rarely file under Chapter 7,90 in part because Chapter 7 is
86. 11 U.S.C. § 1129(a)(7) ("The court shall confirm a plan only if all of the following
requirements are met: ... With respect to each impaired class of claims or interests ... each
holder ... has accepted the plan or will receive or retain ... property of a value ... not less than
the amount that such holder would so receive or retain if the debtor were liquidated under
chapter 7 of this title .... ").
87. See, e.g., Douglas G. Baird & Robert K. Rasmussen, The End of Bankruptcy, 55 STAN. L.
REV. 751, 786-87 (2002) (arguing that liquidations not only can, but already have, replaced
reorganizations); Douglas G. Baird & Robert K. Rasmussen, Chapter 11 at Twilight, 56 STAN. L.
REV. 645, 699 (2003) ("Any going concern surplus can be captured for creditors via a sale.").
Contra Lynn M. LoPucki, The Nature of the Bankrupt Firm, 56 STAN. L. REV. 645, 666-70 (2003)
(explaining why sales sometimes destroy value rather than capturing it).
88. See discussion supra note 82.
89. See 11 U.S.C. § 721 2000("The court may authorize the trustee to operate the business
of the debtor for a limited period, if such operation is in the best interests of the estate and
consistent with the orderly liquidation of the estate.").
90. Of 695 cases filed by large, public companies under United States bankruptcy law since
October 1, 1979, only one was filed under Chapter 7. Lynn M. LoPucki, Bankruptcy Research
Database, at http://lopucki.law.ucla.edu (last visited May 17, 2004). Read-Rite filed a Chapter 7
case in Oakland, California, June 17, 2003, and the trustee successfully sold the business as a
going concern on July 24, 2003. Olaf de Senerpont Domis, Western Digital Gets Read-Rite, THE
DEAL, July 25, 2003, LEXIS NEWS Library CURNWS file.
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missing provisions necessary to make sale as a going concern feasible
for most firms. In the case of a public corporation, at least, the
liquidation contemplated by the best interests of creditors test is the
piecemeal liquidation of the assets of a closed business. 91  The
liquidation values to which creditors and shareholders are entitled
under the best interests of creditors test are thus far below
reorganization values. 92 Those liquidation values do place theoretical
limits on the amounts for which team production entitlements have
priority. Those limits, however, are seldom relevant in the
determination of actual distributions. If the firm continues to operate,
assets will nearly always be sufficient both to satisfy team
entitlements and to assure creditors and shareholders of eventual
payment of the liquidation values to which they are entitled.
C. Reorganization for Whose Benefit?
The preceding subpart demonstrated that the recognition of
team production entitlements in bankruptcy is not inconsistent with
the full recognition of both the legal and contractual rights of creditors
and shareholders. That argument frees the board to honor the team
production contract, but does not tell them what to do with their
freedom.
Team production entitlements are entitlements to "rents and
surpluses." One might suppose that a firm that cannot meet its
obligations to creditors under nonbankruptcy law has no rents and
surpluses. That supposition, however, ignores the contract between
debtor and creditors that permits resort to bankruptcy. Creditors have
agreed to bankruptcy and, accordingly, to receive only that to which
they are entitled under bankruptcy law and process. If the claims of
creditors and shareholders are reduced to those minimums, rents and
surpluses exist. Whether the board should reduce the claims to those
minimums is a matter confined to the board members' business
judgment. Consistent with this analysis, Congress did not determine
91. See, e.g., JACKSON, supra note 13, at 224 (acknowledging that selling firms as going
concerns under Chapter 7 "would require changes in other legal rules"). But see Baird, supra
note 31, at 139 ("Nothing in current law, however, prevents a sale of the firm as a going concern
in Chapter 7 .... "). Presumably, Baird means only that the law does not bar such sales, not that
such sales are practical.
92. Lynn M. LoPucki & William C. Whitford, Bargaining Over Equity's Share in the
Bankruptcy Reorganization of Large, Publicly Held Companies, 139 U. PA. L. REV. 125, 172
(1990) (quoting disclosure statement estimates of the liquidation values of solvent firms that
ranged from "little or nothing" to 77 cents on the dollar); see also Ronald J. Mann, Strategy and
Force in the Liquidation of Secured Debt, 96 MICH. L. REV. 159, 177-83 (1997) (reporting huge




entitlements to the excess of going concern value over liquidation
value, but left that determination to negotiations among the parties.
One of those parties is the board, acting for the debtor in possession.
The House Report on the Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978 states,
The bill does not impose a rigid financial rule for the plan. The parties are left to their
own to negotiate a fair settlement. The question of whether creditors are entitled to the
going-concern or liquidation value of the business is impossible to answer. It is
unrealistic to assume that the bill could or even should attempt to answer that question.
Instead negotiation among the parties after full disclosure will govern how the value of
the reorganizing company will be distributed among creditors and stockholders. The bill
only sets the outer limits on the outcome: it must be somewhere between the going-
concern value and the liquidation value.
9 3
One objective of the team production contract is to permit the
debtor to remain in business at the time of bankruptcy. From the
standpoint of efficiency, the debtor should remain in business if the
total benefits to team members from continued operation exceed the
total benefits to team members from liquidation. In other words,
reorganization should occur when it benefits the members of the team
in the aggregate. Because the firm's decisions will affect some people
who are not members of the team, this standard will permit the firm
to externalize some costs, but the amount will be far below the
amounts permitted under the Creditors' Bargain Theory. 94
A second objective of the team production contract is
distributional. Each team member has authorized the board to honor
the commitments the firm made to other team members in order to
induce them to join the team. If necessary, the firm should use
bankruptcy to reduce its formal obligations to creditors and
shareholders sufficiently to meet those commitments. In seeking that
reduction, the firm becomes an adversary to creditors and
shareholders with respect to their formal claims, but continues to
represent them as a fiduciary with respect to their team production
entitlements.
93. H.R. REP. No. 95-595, at 224 (1978).
94. The Creditors' Bargain theory permits the firm to externalize the same costs as the
Team Production Theory and, in addition, the costs incurred by team members other than
creditors and shareholders to generate the entitlements that the Creditors' Bargain theory will
dishonor.
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V. COMPARING THE CREDITORS' BARGAIN AND TEAM PRODUCTION
THEORIES
Baird and Jackson have presented the Creditors' Bargain
Theory as both a positive and a normative theory of bankruptcy.95
This Part argues that the Team Production Theory is better on both
accounts. That is, Team Production better explains existing
bankruptcy reorganization institutions, and, to the extent those
institutions are in fact the choice of the contracting team members,
better describes the forms that bankruptcy institutions should take.96
A. Whose Interests Should Bankruptcy Serve?
Whose interests bankruptcy should serve has been hotly
contested between Creditors' Bargain theorists and traditional
bankruptcy scholars. Professor Elizabeth Warren is one of many who
have argued that the purposes of bankruptcy reorganization include
saving jobs and companies for the benefit of numerous impacted
constituencies, not just creditors:
Bankruptcy policy also takes into account the distributional impact of a business failure
on parties who are not creditors and who have no formal legal rights to the assets of the
business. Business closings affect employees who will lose jobs, taxing authorities that
will lose ratable property, suppliers that will lose customers, nearby property owners
who will lose beneficial neighbors, and current customers who must go elsewhere.
Congress was acutely aware of the wider effect of a business failure on the surrounding
community and it adopted the 1978 Bankruptcy Code specifically to ameliorate those
harmful effects .... 97
95. A positive theory seeks to "explain" observed phenomena by demonstrating that it is
consistent with the theory. E.g., Thomas H. Jackson & Robert E. Scott, An Essay on Bankruptcy
Sharing and the Creditor's Bargain, 75 VA. L. REV. 155, 179 (1989) ("We now consider whether a
richer version of the creditors' bargain better explains the apparent tensions that mark these
features of federal bankruptcy law."). A normative theory attempts to state what is desirable.
E.g., Thomas H. Jackson, Avoiding Powers in Bankruptcy, 36 STAN. L. REV. 725, 750 (1984):
The creditors' bargain model, which provides a framework for analyzing that
relationship, suggests that using nonbankruptcy entitlements, valued at the date of
bankruptcy, should constitute the normative baseline for valuing bankruptcy
entitlements and that a collective proceeding must upset only those rules that work to
the detriment of the creditors as a group.
96. Because government offers contracting parties a limited menu of bankruptcy options,
their choice of one does not prove the one optimal. But in a general sense, at least, the options
offered are themselves the winners of a competition and so entitled to some credence. See Frank
H. Easterbrook, Is Corporate Bankruptcy Efficient?, 27 J.'FIN. ECON. 411, 413 (1990) (asserting
that "[elnduring legal institutions endure either because they are efficient or because they
redistribute wealth to concentrated, politically effective interest groups"); id. at 412 (arguing
that bankruptcy reorganization is in the former category).
97. Elizabeth Warren, Bankruptcy Policymaking in an Imperfect World, 92 MICH. L. REV.
336, 354-55 (1993).
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Consistent with Team Production Theory, Warren acknowledges that
"the Code protects the interests of parties without formal legal rights
only indirectly" by protecting the debtor and the business from
creditors. 98 Inconsistent with the Team Production Theory, however,
Warren regards bankruptcy as deliberately redistributional. 99
Others have also sought to justify bankruptcy's service of a
broad range of interests. Professor Nathalie Martin advocated direct
recognition of the interests of persons with "noneconomic rights"100
and Professor Karen Gross did the same with respect to "community
interests." 101 Neither, however, has been able to explain adequately
how a bankruptcy court would weigh these interests against one
another or against the interests of creditors and shareholders.'0
2
The Team Production Theory is essentially in agreement with
these scholars as to the interests to be served by bankruptcy. It adds,
however, both a new explanation for the service and a new standard
for determining the limits of the obligation.
Under the Team Production Theory, the bankrupt firm should
honor its obligations to all who made firm-specific investments at the
invitation of the firm and could not protect them in other ways. This
rationale might extend to any of the persons mentioned in the Warren
quotation. It might justify the retention of particular long-term
employees, for example, despite the fact that others were now
available to work more cheaply. It might justify the payment of
"retention bonuses" of the type that have recently become common in
reorganization cases. It might also justify continuing to operate the
business in a community where costs were higher than in some
alternative location. The firm-specific investments so recognized might
include the expenses incurred by employees and suppliers in moving
to the community to join the team, or tax concessions made by the
local taxing authority to attract the debtor to the community. They
might also include the investments and efforts consumers of computer
98. Id. at 355-56.
99. Id. at 353 ("[W]hen bankruptcy law deviates from a strict equality principle, it does so
for self-consciously redistributive ends."). Professor Ronald Mann responded to Warren by
offering one theory as to why bankruptcy might not be redistributional: reorganization value
belonged to the government, whose legal machinery created it. The government cedes that value
to the parties as part of the bankruptcy process. Mann, supra note 22, at 1032-38.
100. Nathalie D Martin, Noneconomic Interests in Bankruptcy: Standing on the Outside
Looking In, 59 OHIO ST. L. REV. 429 (1998).
101. See Gross, supra note 84.
102. See Barry S. Schermer, Response to Professor Gross: Taking the Interests of the
Community into Account in Bankruptcy: A Modern-Day Tale of Belling the Cat, 72 WASH. U. L.Q.
1049, 1050-52 (1994) (arguing that bankruptcy judges could not practically weigh community
interests and that in trying they might come in conflict with legislatures).
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products make when they buy and learn to use products. In each of
these cases, the firm invited the investment and the investor placed
trust in the directors to reciprocate. Meeting these obligations does no
violence to the rights of team members who do have legal rights
against assets, because the holders of the legal rights have contracted
that the obligations to the team be met.
The members of the board of directors, acting as fiduciaries,
decide which of these claims to recognize and how much to pay the
claim holders. In making the decision, the board is protected by the
business judgment rule. 10 3 Under the rule, dissatisfied claimants have
a remedy only if the directors yield to conflicting interests, fail to
inform themselves to the extent they reasonably deem necessary, or
act in bad faith. 10 4 Even when someone is entitled to reverse the
board's actions, the courts do not decide who is entitled to money.
They only decide who is not, by invalidating or declining to authorize
particular payments. 
105
Creditors' Bargain theorists acknowledge that "the notion of
keeping firms in business seems to be meant as an independent
policy."'0 6 They nevertheless apply their theory to reject that policy,
concluding that bankruptcy exists solely for the benefit of creditors
and shareholders. 10 7 Consistent with this narrow conception of the
interests to be served, the Creditors' Bargain Theory seeks
maximization of "the value of a given pool of assets"'08 ex post, rather
than the value of the firm ex ante. Positively and normatively, that
statement of the objectives of bankruptcy reorganization is too narrow.
103. See Nimmer & Feinberg, supra note 67, at 1.
104. That is, the business judgment continues to shield the board after bankruptcy as it did
before. See id.. For a general statement of the rule, see STEPHEN M. BAINBRIDGE, CORPORATION
LAW AND ECONOMICS § 6.4.B (2002).
105. 11 U.S.C. § 1108 authorizes the "trustee" to "operate the debtor's business" during the
bankruptcy case unless the court orders otherwise. The debtor in possession generally has the
rights and powers of a trustee. 11 U.S.C. § 1107(a) (2000). The "debtor"-that is, the corporation
that filed the case-is the debtor in possession. 11 U.S.C. § 1101(1). Through its agents, the
board acts for the corporation. Thus, in effect, the board has substantially the rights and powers
of a trustee. The board generally will seek authorization from the court to make payments
outside the ordinary course of business. The court's role is confined to ruling on those requests
and voiding payments not authorized by the court or the Code. 11 U.S.C. § 549(a).
106. JACKSON, supra note 13, at 25.
107. Id. ("[W]orkers... are not owners with substantive rights against the assets. For that
reason the owners are free to close the business without considering the interests of the workers
if doing so brings the owners more money.").
108. Id. at 24.
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1. Comparison as Positive Theory
With respect to the interests served, the Team Production
Theory can be compared to the Creditors' Bargain Theory on at least
three criteria: (1) how well each describes the statutory scheme, (2)
how well each reflects the intent of the statutory scheme as described
in legislative history and court opinions, and (3) how well each
describes the actual pattern of outcomes in bankruptcy cases. Little
evidence is available with respect to the third criteria, 109 so this
discussion is limited to the first two.
Consistent with the Creditors' Bargain Theory, the text of the
bankruptcy code provides distributional entitlements only to creditors
and shareholders. 1 0 Inconsistent with that theory, however, the
Bankruptcy Code in some instances recognizes that persons other
than creditors and shareholders may be "parties in interest" whose
interests must be considered."1 But the major inconsistency between
the text of the Code and the tenets of the Creditors' Bargain Theory
are the provisions that leave the board of directors in control of the
firm during reorganization.1 1 2 Board control of an insolvent firm is a
feature of Chapter 11 for which the Team Production Theory can
account and for which the Creditors' Bargain Theory cannot. If
bankruptcy is to serve only the interests of the creditor-owners, why
should a board supposedly elected by shareholders remain in control of
the firm?
The legislative history of the Bankruptcy Code and court
opinions interpreting it both indicate that the interests to be served
under Chapter 11 are not confined to those of creditors and
shareholders.11 3 The legislative history, for example, states,
The purpose of a business reorganization case, unlike a liquidation case, is to
restructure a business's finances so that it may continue to operate, provide its
employees with jobs, pay its creditors, and produce a return for its stockholders .... It is
109. To be useful in such an evaluation, the data would have to support a distinction
between (1) actions taken in reorganization for the benefit of creditors and shareholders, and (2)
actions taken in reorganization contrary to the interests of creditors and shareholders, for the
benefit of others. In practice, that distinction would be difficult to make. Actors usually describe
their actions as serving the interests of both groups simultaneously.
110. E.g., 11 U.S.C. § 1129(b)(2) (cramdown provisions specifying entitlements only for
creditors and shareholders).
111. E.g., 11 U.S.C. § 1104(a)(2), discussed infra note 129 and accompanying text.
112. See supra note 103 and accompanying text.
113. E.g., Richard V. Butler & Scott M. Gilpatric, A Re-Examination of the Purposes and
Goals of Bankruptcy, 2 AM. BANKR. INST. L. REV. 269, 284 (1994) ('Though Congress did not
address the problem of preserving external going concern value as such, it was certainly
concerned with ameliorating the impact of business failures on employees, the parties with
whom a firm contracts, and the surrounding community.").
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more economically efficient to reorganize than to liquidate, because it preserves jobs and
assets.
1 14
In language often quoted by the lower courts, the Supreme Court
opined that "The fundamental purpose of reorganization is to prevent
a debtor from going into liquidation, with an attendant loss of jobs and
possible misuse of economic resources."' 15 Not only do the courts see
Chapter 11 as expressing a preference for reorganization over
liquidation, that preference is not based solely on the relative values
generated for the owners of the firm. 116 Preservation of the firm is an
independent value that partially accounts for the choice. 117 The Team
Production Theory of Bankruptcy Reorganization reflects these values;
the Creditors' Bargain Theory does not.
2. Comparison as Normative Theory
The Team Production Theory is premised on an assumed
understanding among team members that the board will serve the
interests of all team members. Making that assumption, the Team
Production Theory's inclusion of all team members among the
interests to be served in bankruptcy is normatively superior in two
respects. First, it results in deployment of the firm's resources in
accord with the ex ante team production contract and is thus efficient.
Team members entering into a contract at the time of bankruptcy
might choose a different deployment. They would commit their
resources to the firm's future, not to paying entitlements the firm
granted in return for past contributions. But if directors succumbed to
that temptation, they would, at least in theory, trigger a recursive
firm crisis. Knowing that past team production entitlements had not
been honored, prospective team members would see no reason to
believe that future entitlements would be treated differently. With
team members unable to rely on team entitlements, those members
would be forced to insist on less efficient, legally binding contracts
instead. Team production-for some firms the more efficient form of
contracting-would cease to be viable as a form of business
organization. Professors Shleifer and Summers made this statement
114. H.R. REP. No. 95-595, at 220 (1977).
115. NLRB v. Bildisco & Bildisco, 465 U.S. 513, 528 (1984).
116. E.g., Butler & Gilpatric, supra note 113, at 288 ("If Chapter 11 proceedings in fact have
some bias in favor of reorganizing a firm, it may simply be a recognition of the external costs of
liquidation.").
117. In re A & B Heating & Air Conditioning, 823 F.2d 462, 465 (11th Cir. 1987) ('The Code
expresses a preference toward reorganization rather than liquidation; a viable reorganization




in the context of hostile takeovers, but it is equally applicable to
bankruptcy reorganization:
If potential stakeholders believe that their contracts will surely be violated whenever
they collect more from the firm than they put in, they will not agree to implicit
contracts. Potential suppliers will not invest in relationship-specific capital, the young
will shirk if they expect no raise in the future, and firms will be unable to reduce labor
costs by offering insurance against uncertain ability to their workers. Even if breach via
takeover is not a certainty but only a possibility, the opportunities for long-term
contracting will be limited. To the extent that realizing gains from trade requires such
contracting, these gains will remain unrealized and ex ante welfare will be reduced.
11 8
This argument is essentially the same one that has long been accepted
for honoring creditors' bargains in bankruptcy. The only difference is
that Team Production Theory recognizes a wider range of obligations.
The more inclusive Team Production Theory is also
normatively superior to the Creditors' Bargain Theory in minimizing
the externalization of the firm's costs. Even before the development of
the Team Production Theory of Bankruptcy Reorganization, Professor
Elizabeth Warren had criticized the Creditors' Bargain Theory for
facilitating the externalization of costs. 119 She noted that many of the
social costs incurred in the creation of a firm were borne by employees,
communities, suppliers, customers, and others. When the firm failed,
those parties were left with the costs. The effect was to create an
inefficient incentive for creditors to quickly terminate one firm and
move on to the next. To Warren's point, Team Production Theory adds
the standard for determining which costs the firm should internalize:
those incurred by anyone in reasonable reliance on the Team
Production arrangement.
B. The Debtor-In-Possession
When a public corporation files for bankruptcy reorganization,
the corporation-as "debtor-in-possession"-remains in possession of
its property and continues to operate the business. Acting as a
fiduciary for all parties in interest, the debtor-in-possession is the
principal actor in the case, making required disclosures, formulating
and implementing the business plan, negotiating the reorganization
plan, and shepherding the plan through the legal process. The
dominant role of the debtor-in-possession is reflected in the results of
a recent empirical study of professional fees in bankruptcy
118. Shleifer & Summers, supra note 35, at 45.
119. Warren, supra note 97, at 356 ("[The protection of parties without legal rights also
reflects a more profound economic reality: the parties with formal legal rights never completely
internalize the full costs of a business failure."); see also Butler & Gilpatric, supra note 113, at
282-84 (discussing the externalization of costs that occurs on liquidation of the firm).
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reorganization cases. The study found that 80 percent of the
professional fees authorized by the court were incurred by the debtor-
in-possession. The remaining 20 percent were divided among creditors'
committees, indenture trustees, and equity committees.
120
During bankruptcy reorganization, the board of directors
continues to exist and to exercise the authority it exercised prior to
filing. The board remains in control even when the corporation is
grossly insolvent.12' The inconsistency with the shareholder primacy
theory should be obvious. If the directors are agents of the
shareholders and stewards of shareholder interests, the directors
should not be running a business that is now "owned" by the
creditors.'
22
The debtor-in-possession doctrine, like the public corporation,
is almost uniquely American. In foreign systems, a representative of
creditors is usually in charge of the estate. 23 Even in the United
States, the debtor-in-possession doctrine was abandoned for a period
with respect to large, public companies. 24 The legislative history
explains the doctrine as a compromise necessary to induce managers
to bring their ailing firms into bankruptcy.125
The Team Production Theory explains why directors should
and ordinarily do remain in control of even grossly insolvent
reorganizing corporations. The directors are not agents of the
120. Lynn M. LoPucki & Joseph W. Doherty, The Determinants of Professional Fees in Large
Bankruptcy Reorganization Cases, 1 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 111, 114 (2004).
121. Gross insolvency is not even a ground for the appointment of a trustee. 11 U.S.C. §
1104(a) (2000) (listing the grounds for the appointment of a trustee).
122. "Owned" is Jackson's word. See supra note 29 and accompanying text.
123. Evan D. Flaschen et al., Foreign Representatives in U.S. Chapter 11 Cases: Filling the
Void in the Law of Multinational Insolvencies, 17 CONN. J. INT'L L. 3, 15 (2001) ("However, very
few countries have adopted the debtor-in-possession concept, preferring to install a court
appointee as manager of the debtor's affairs.").
124. From 1938 to 1979, the Bankruptcy Act required that large public companies file under
Chapter X of the Act. Karen M. Gebbia-Pinetti, Small Business Reorganization and the SABRE
Proposals, 7 FORDHAM J. CORP. & FIN. L. 253, 258, n.13 (2002) ("Congress intended that ...
large, publicly held debtors would file under chapter X."). Chapter X directed that a trustee be
appointed in every case. 11 US.C. § 556 (1970) (repealed effective October 1, 1979). The trustee
displaced the board, but often hired the former officers. Elizabeth Warren, The Untenable Case
for Repeal of Chapter 11, 102 YALE L.J. 437, 455 (1992) (reporting that "upwards of 70% of
managers remained in control of their businesses" in Chapter X cases).
125. H.R. REP. No. 95-595, at 233 (1977) ("Debtors' lawyers that participated in the
development of a standard for the appointment of a trustee were adamant that a standard that
led to too frequent appointment would prevent debtors from seeking relief under [the
reorganization law] and would leave the [law] largely unused except in extreme cases."); see also
Douglas G. Baird, The Initiation Problem in Bankruptcy, 11 INT'L REV. L. & ECON. 223, 232
(1991) ("By allowing the managers to continue, if only for a time, bankruptcy law ensures that
the mangers will not let creditors exercise nonbankruptcy rights of debt collection that will shut
down a firm that should survive.").
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underwater shareholders. They are instead the fiduciaries entrusted
by the team members, including the creditors, to determine the
distributions of the team's rents and surpluses.
126
Why, then, are the creditors and shareholders also represented
by committees during the bankruptcy process? The reason is that
creditors and shareholders have both Team Production entitlements
and legal rights against the team. Bankruptcy will alter the latter.
The degree of alteration is a matter not committed to board discretion.
With respect to those legal rights, creditors and shareholders may be
adverse to the board. Consequently, the creditors and shareholders
need independent representation.
C. Protecting Board Independence
The Bankruptcy Code says nothing one way or the other about
the continuation of corporate democracy during reorganization.
Nevertheless, the courts have, in several instances, enjoined
shareholders from meeting to elect directors during reorganization.'
27
The injunctions have been granted in the cases of both solvent and
insolvent corporations. Shareholder Primacy and Creditors' Bargain
theorists would have difficulty explaining why the shareholders of a
solvent Manville Corporation should be enjoined from electing
directors who would aggressively pursue shareholder interests in plan
negotiations. 128 Team Production theorists would not. They would see
the shareholders' attempt to elect a new board that would serve
shareholder interests alone as the attempt of a single team member to
seize the team's entire rents or surpluses.
Nor does bankruptcy law allow creditors to take control of the
reorganizing firm from the board. The bankruptcy court has statutory
authority to appoint a trustee in place of the debtor-in-possession, but
only for egregious wrongdoing by incumbent management or when
"such appointment is in the interests of creditors, any equity security
holders, and other interests of the estate."1 29 Inclusion of a reference
to "other interests of the estate," after naming creditors and
shareholders, suggests that such interests exist, but are difficult to
describe. That is entirely consistent with the Team Production Theory
126. See supra Part III.A.
127. See supra note 68.
128. The bankruptcy court entered such an injunction. The Second Circuit reversed and
remanded for an evidentiary hearing to determine whether the committee was guilty of a "clear
abuse" in calling the meeting. Manville Corp. v. Equity Sec. Holders Comm., 801 F.2d 60, 69 (2d
Cir. 1986).
129. 11 U.S.C. § 1104(a)(2) (2000) (emphasis added).
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of Bankruptcy Reorganizaton. So is the lack of any exception to permit
the appointment of a trustee for a clearly insolvent corporation.
Chapter 11 trustees are rarely appointed until it is clear that the firm
will not continue operations. 130 Also consistent with Team Production
Theory, the omission of gross insolvency as a ground for the
appointment of a trustee protects the board from even a class of
creditors that is the sole residual claimant. Substitution of a court-
appointed trustee for the board of a going concern is rare because it
deprives the entire team of its contractually chosen trustee and allows
creditors to seize the team's entire rents or surpluses.
The Creditors' Bargain Theory is inconsistent with the legal
standard for the appointment of trustees. First, the theory holds that
bankruptcy exists to serve exclusively the interests of creditors and
shareholders. It follows that bankruptcy courts should take no other
interest into account in determining whether to appoint a trustee. Yet,
to comply with Bankruptcy Code Section 1104(b)(2), the courts must.
Second, the Creditors' Bargain Theory teaches that the residual
claimants should be in control.1 31 In the case of a clearly insolvent
corporation, creditors are the residual claimants.1 32 It would seem
they should be entitled to substitute their representatives for the
board of directors. Yet, they are not. The Creditors' Bargain Theory
suggests no reason for the scheme of corporate governance recognized
in American bankruptcy law: Directors ostensibly selected by
shareholders to serve shareholder interests remain in control of even
clearly insolvent firms.
D. Plan Negotiations
Creditors' Bargain theorists see creditors and shareholders as
the sole "owners" of the firm's assets and thus the only ones whose
interests should be taken into account in the reorganization. 133 On
that assumption, one would expect representatives of creditors and
130. Lynn M. LoPucki, The Debtor in Full Control-Systems Failure Under Chapter 11 of the
Bankruptcy Code?, 57 AM. BANKR. L.J. 247, 259-60 (1983) (reporting that "[iun four of the five
cases in which a trustee was appointed the debtor had, at the time of appointment, already
expressed its unwillingness to continue to operate the business, a sure indication that
continuance was not feasible").
131. Douglas G. Baird & Thomas H. Jackson, Bargaining After the Fall and the Contours of
the Absolute Priority Rule, 55 U. CHI. L. REV. 738, 775 (1988) ('The law of corporate
reorganizations should focus on identifying the residual owner, limiting agency problems in
representing the residual owner, and making sure that the residual owner has control over the
negotiations that the firm must make while it is restructuring.").
132. JACKSON, supra note 13, at 168 (1986) ('That groups consists of the residual claimants,
who in the case of an insolvent company are almost always the unsecured creditors.").
133. See supra notes 29-31.
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shareholders to lead the plan negotiations. The board of directors
would have no role except to furnish information to the creditors and
shareholders.
In fact, directors take the central role in plan negotiations.
They act through managers and professionals. The professionals
represent the debtor-in-possession and are barred, legally and
ethically, from representing the interests of creditors or
shareholders. 134 The Bankruptcy Code gives the debtor-in-possession
the exclusive right to file a proposed plan during the first 120 days of
the case and such extensions as the court may allow for good cause.
135
In most large, public company reorganizations, the court extends this
"exclusivity" right for the duration of the case. 136 In those cases,
neither creditors nor shareholders can ever file a plan. Typically, the
debtor-in-possession negotiates the plan with representatives of
creditors and shareholders. They negotiate as adversaries. In our
study of the bankruptcy reorganizations of large, public companies,
Professor William C. Whitford and I found that in 11 of 25 cases (44
percent), the managers in charge of the firm 137 saw themselves as
aligned with neither creditors nor shareholders. Seven of the 25
managements sought principally to "preserve the company." Four
sought to maximize the estate. In two cases the managers of insolvent
companies saw themselves as aligned with equity. 138 A Creditors'
Bargain theorist can only wonder on whose behalf management
negotiates.139 The Team Production theorist knows: the members of
the production team.
Sara Kalin, Joseph Doherty, and I recently discovered and
documented high failure rates among firms emerging from bankruptcy
reorganization.1 40 The frequency of these failures-over half the cases
134. C.R. Bowles, Jr. & Nancy B. Rapoport, Has the DIP's Attorney Become the Ultimate
Creditors' Lawyer in Bankruptcy Reorganization Cases?, 5 AM. BANKR. INST. L. REV. 47, 59
(1997) ("Estate Counsel is supposed to owe its allegiance to the Bankruptcy Estate and not to the
principals of the Estate.").
135. 11 U.S.C. § 1121(b), (d) (2000).
136. LoPucki & Whitford, supra note 68, at 693, 717 n.177 (finding, in a 1993 study of
reorganizations of public companies, that in 34 of 43 cases studied, exclusivity was extended for
the duration of the case).
137. In our study, we conflated directors and officers. Specifically, we reported on the
activities of the CEO.
138. LoPucki & Whitford, supra note 68, at 742-47.
139. Jackson, for example, seemed to see no purpose in reorganization negotiations.
JACKSON, supra note 13, at 223 ("For these reasons the premises for negotiation in a chapter 11
process seem unproven and unpromising.").
140. Lynn M. LoPucki & Sara D. Kalin, The Failure of Public Company Bankruptcies in
Delaware and New York: Empirical Evidence of a "Race to the Bottom," 54 VAND. L. REV. 231
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in Delaware 141-combined with the magnitude of the associated
operating losses-an amount equal to 18 percent of the firm's reported
total assets before bankruptcy for the cases in Delaware142-make
clear these were not "efficent" failures, but failures in the process of
bankruptcy reorganization.
143
Harvey R. Miller, a leading bankruptcy reorganization
counselor, believes these increasing failure rates result from recent
changes in the plan negotiation environment. Miller identifies two
such changes in particular. First, he asserts that debtors have less
leverage in negotiations because the courts have been rushing the
cases.' 44 Second, Miller charges that "[d]istress debt trading and
[resulting] changes in bankruptcy relationships have destroyed the
symbiotic relationship of debtor and creditor."1 45  Both explanations
are consistent with Team Production Theory.
Boards, as representatives of the production team, tend to
apply resources to improvements in business operations. They tend to
favor reorganization. 146 Senior creditors do better if resources are
applied to the payment of legal claims. They tend to favor liquidations
that eliminate the competing team entitlement claims. Reducing
debtor-in-possession bargaining leverage reduces resources available
for business operations and so tends to increase failure rates.
Distress debt trading weakens the team by substituting a
financial speculator for a team member. Team members have team
obligations as well as team entitlements. At the time of bankruptcy, a
creditor's team obligations may be greater than its entitlements. An
example might be the bank lender that was allowed to reap high
profits in the past on the understanding that the bank would "work
(2001); Lynn M. LoPucki & Joseph W. Doherty, Why Are Delaware and New York Bankruptcy
Reorganizations Failing?, 55 VAND. L. REV. 1933 (2002).
141. LoPucki & Doherty, supra note 140, at 1945.
142. LoPucki & Kalin, supra note 140, at 236-38.
143. Lynn M. LoPucki, Can the Market Evaluate Legal Regimes? A Response to Professors
Rasmussen, Thomas, and Skeel, 54 VAND. L. REV. 331, 333-38 (2001) (presenting data on
emerging firms' losses from confirmation to refiling).
144. Harvey R. Miller, Chapter 11 Reorganization Cases and the Delaware Myth, 55 VAND. L.
REV. 1987, 2013 (2002) ("Fearing that the bankruptcy court will no longer grant a once routine
extension of exclusivity, debtors now are rushed to propose creditor-friendly, economically
deficient plans to garner enough votes to pass a plan during the debtor's exclusivity period.").
Doherty's and my findings support Miller's assertion. We found an inverse, and statistically
significant relationship between the speed of reorganization and the likelihood of failure. The
faster the reorganization, the more likely was the emerging firm to fail within five years after
confirmation. LoPucki & Doherty, supra note 140, at 1975-77.
145. Miller, supra note 144, at 2014.
146. Among 25 bankrupt firms Whitford and I studied, the managements of seven (28
percent) put "preservation of the company" ahead of any other objective. LoPucki & Whitford,
supra note 68, at 742-47.
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with" the debtor in difficult times. Sale of the bank's claim to an
investor that will consider only the investor's immediate self-interest
breaches that understanding and harms the team. Distress debt
traders, Miller asserts, "may sacrifice the long-term viability of a
debtor for the ability to realize substantial and quick returns on their
investments."'
147
The Creditors' Bargain theorist would likely see no relevance in
the changes Miller laments. Reorganization law gives classes of
interested creditors and shareholders each a veto over any plan that
does not afford the class its full rights under the absolute priority rule.
The Creditors' Bargain theorist would suppose that a plan that
provided less than full payment could not be rushed because any
dissatisfied class could veto.
The Team Production theorist, by contrast, would realize that a
third interest is at stake: that of the production team. The team's
representative, the board of directors, has the exclusive right to file a
reorganization plan ("exclusivity") during the first 120 days of the case
plus whatever extensions of that period the court grants. Through the
1980s, courts generally granted whatever extensions the board
requested. Miller's complaint is that in more recent years, courts have
been less inclined to grant extensions. The result has been to
undermine the ability of the board to assert the interests of the team.
Similarly, the Creditors' Bargain theorist has no reason to
believe that the interests of one owner of a class of claims should be
materially different from the interests of another owner of the same
claims. But a Team Production theorist would recognize the shift in
ownership as the substitution of an outsider for a team member and a
breach of the non-legally enforceable contract under which the team
came together. 148
E. Is Reorganization Efficient?
When lawyers who reorganize large, public companies explain
what they are doing, they often say that they are "preserving the
company"1 49 in order to save its "going concern value." Creditors'
Bargain theorists respond that the going concern value of a firm is not
threatened by distress. Sale of the firm as a going concern preserves
it. Nothing is lost by sale because a firm, they say, cannot be "more
147. Miller, supra note 144, at 2016.
148. See Shleifer & Summers, supra note 35, at 41 (arguing that hostile takeovers constitute
a breach of trust because control goes to a bidder "who is not committed to upholding the implicit
contracts with stakeholders").
149. LoPucki & Whitford, supra note 68, at 743-45 (reporting such descriptions).
776 [Vol. 57:3:741
BANKIR UPTCY REORGANIZATION
valuable in the hands of its current claimants than it would be in the
hands of third parties."150  For these reasons, the leading Creditors'
Bargain theorists prefer that public companies be sold as going
concerns rather than reorganized.151 In the past, defenders of
reorganization have responded that mandatory sales would interfere
with bankruptcy triggering mechanisms,1 52 that markets are too thin
to support mandatory sales,1 53 and that selling costs would be too
high.15
4
The Team Production Theory can justify reorganization even
when the firm could be sold for more than its reorganization value.
This can be explained two ways. First, to provide an environment in
which teams can come together and rely on the mediation of the
board, the law must protect the team's expectations. If firms are put
"in play" by the filing of a bankruptcy case, those expectations may be
frustrated-just as they would be in the context of a nonbankruptcy
hostile takeover. 155  That practice violates the Team Production
contract, and so interferes with firm formation ex ante.
The second explanation begins by noting that the
"reorganization value" of a firm, as commonly computed, includes only
distributions to shareholders and creditors. The calculation ignores
distributions on team entitlements-the advantages of reorganization
to managers, workers, suppliers, customers, taxing authorities, and
communities. 56 Selling the firm to a buyer who can pay more only
because that buyer can then default on team entitlements reduces
rather than increases social wealth.
Team Production Theory is not offended by all sales of firms as
going concerns. Entrustment of the firm to the directors includes
entrustment for purposes of sale. But the sale should occur only when
the directors choose to sell, the unambiguous contract of a team
member entitles that member to a sale, or the sale is for the benefit of
150. JACKSON, supra note 13, at 221.
151. Id. at 221-22 ("There is no reason why chapter 7 could not be used as the vehicle to sell
the firm as a going concern in the same way that companies go public."); Douglas G. Baird, The
Uneasy Case for Corporate Reorganizations, 15 J. LEGAL STUD. 127, 128 (1986) ("In this paper I
ask whether corporate reorganizations should exist at all."); id. at 145 ("The thrust of the
argument presented in this paper is that the owners of a firm, especially a publicly held firm,
would likely prefer a sale of the firm outright to whomever was willing to pay the most for it.").
152. E.g., LoPucki & Whitford, supra note 68, at 756-57.
153. E.g., id. at 758-65.
154. E.g., id. at 753-67.
155. Shleifer & Summers, supra note 35, at 53-54 (arguing that hostile takeovers frustrate
the expectations of corporate stakeholders under implicit contracts).
156. See Butler & Gilpatric, supra note 113, at 282-84 (arguing that firms have "external
going concern value" that should be preserved along with the "internal" going concern value
commonly recognized in economic theory).
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a non-team member, such as a tort creditor. The reason is simple:
That is the deal the team members made. Not to honor it would
introduce inefficiencies.
VI. CONCLUSIONS
Team Production is not a theory with which I feel comfortable.
The theory is based on a wholesale grant of unfettered power to
directors. My inclination is to think that will not work. Power
corrupts, and absolute power corrupts absolutely. The almost daily
reports of director fraud, negligence, and indiscretion in the
newspapers confirms my inclination. Only a fool would trust corporate
directors.
Yet the evidence that Blair and Stout have assembled in favor
of their Team Production Theory is impressive. Not only do fools trust
directors, nearly everyone does. Team Production does indeed seem to
describe how most public corporations function. Team members trust
directors not because they think directors will do a good job, but
because team members lack better alternatives. As Stout likes to put
it, "it's a terrible system-until you consider the alternatives."
Fortunately, Team Production is a falsifiable, and so
empirically testable, theory. It maintains that team members-
including creditors and shareholders-deliberately tie their hands in
dealing with the board of directors. They give up their control over the
board to persuade other members to join the team. They trust the
board to do "the right thing," even though they cannot define what
that is in advance with sufficient specificity to directly contract for it.
These are claims researchers can investigate empirically. Ultimately,
the evidence may prove the Team Production Theory accurate as to
all, or merely some, public companies. Some of the empirical evidence
is already in, and it seems strongly to support Blair and Stout's
theory. That is reason for taking the theory seriously, whether we like
it or not.
Another reason for taking Team Production Theory seriously is
that it fits to bankruptcy law and tradition like a hand in a glove.
Features that make no sense in the Creditors' Bargain Theory-
including the debtor-in-possession, protection of the board from
domination by the holder of the residual interests, the board's central
role in the negotiation of a plan, the persistent insistence that
reorganization benefits society by saving jobs and companies, and the
very existence of reorganization-are all explained comfortably in
Team Production Theory.
[Vel. 57:3:741
2004] BANKRUPTCY REORGANIZATION 779
What is at stake in the Team Production debate is nothing less
than the direction of the giant corporations that form the core of the
American economy. Those corporations are, for the most part,
controlled by independent directors who have been given the freedom
to do what they think is right. If the shareholder primacists win this
debate, independent directors-in or out of bankruptcy-should use
that freedom in the service of shareholders or the creditors who are
about to become shareholders. But if the Team Production theorists
are right, independent directors should use their freedom in the first
instance to preserve and continue the firm and in the second to serve
all corporate constituencies fairly.

